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I. 
SUMMARY 
In his opening brief, Petrus (the homeowner/plaintiff) explained that 
the summary judgment granted on his cause of action against Kirk (the remote 
builder/defendant) for breach of the implied warranty of habitability must be 
reversed. Petrus explained that the district court misconstrued case law from 
this Court-primarily Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircraft 
Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) ("Salmon Rivers"), and Tusch 
Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987) ("Tusch")-and 
erred by misapplying the statute of limitations that governs actions arising in 
contract to a claim that actually arises in tort. 
Kirk responded with a collection of disjointed arguments: that, indeed, 
as the district court concluded, the cause of action arises in contract, not in tort 
(taking a very different read of Salmon River and Tusch than did Petrus); that, 
even if the cause of action arises in tort, Petrus's claim is barred by the 
economic loss rule; that Petrus failed to comply with certain statutory 
prerequisites to filing suit; that, in his contract with Gentry-Boyd (the seller), 
Petrus waived his claim against Kirk; and that policy reasons argue against 
Petrus's appeal. Kirk's brief also advanced his own cross-appeal argument 
that the district court abused its discretion in awarding him less in attorneys' 
fees than he requested. 
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Petrus replies that Kirk's principal argument neglects the clear 
implications of both Salmon River and Tusch: namely, that a remote home 
buyer has a direct cause of action against the builder even without privity of 
contract between them; and that, where a claim exists that is not based on 
privity, it must arise in tort. Otherwise, Petrus rejects Kirk's additional 
arguments wholesale as being beyond the scope of this appeal (as none were 
briefed or ruled upon in the district court), and rejects each, individually, as 
inapplicable to this case (for reasons explained in the Discussion section, 
below). Finally, Petrus explains the full context of the attorneys' fees award 
against him, and concludes that the district court's ruling in that context was 
based on very clear reasoning and was certainly not an abuse of discretion. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: REPRISED 
In his opening brief, Petrus set forth the few salient facts necessary to 
address the single legal issue presented by his appeal: namely, the date he 
purchased his home from Gentry-Boyd (April of2012), the date he discovered 
the construction defects attributable to Kirk (October of 2013), the date he 
filed his lawsuit against Kirk (March of 2014 ), the nature of his claim ( as 
relevant here, only breach of the implied warranty of habitability), and the 
basis of the district court's ruling granting summary judgment (the contract 
statute oflimitations). AOB, pp. 9-10. 
6 
Kirk's Respondent's Brief presents what he calls "some additional facts 
[that] may assist the court." RB, p. 4. The "facts" represented, however, all 
concern the underlying merits of Petrus's claim (reciting, for instance, that the 
prior owner, Gentry-Boyd "never experienced water problems with the 
house," that Kirk "denied responsibility for the door problems," and that Kirk 
inspected the home but "witnessed no problems with the French doors"). RB, 
pp. 4-5. Kirk also asserts as fact that Kirk's first inspection of the home 
revealed that, "at some point after construction was completed, the home had 
been severely altered and damaged." RB, pp. 5-6. 
Those assertions are all disputed; but, more to the point, they have no 
relevance whatsoever to the discrete legal issue presented by this appeal. 
Accordingly, Petrus declines to engage with reference to the contrary evidence 
in the record, and proceeds, instead, directly to a review of the only relevant 
inquiry here (namely, whether the cause of action for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability is a contract claim or a tort claim). 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability Is a Tort. 
In his opening brief, Petrus explained the history of implied warranties 
in the jurisprudence in the United States generally (as summarized by Dean 
Prosser), and in the jurisprudence of Idaho specifically (as illustrated primarily 
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by three cases from this Court: Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 200 P. 395 
(1930) ("Tomita"); Salmon Rivers, supra, 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) 
("Salmon Rivers"); and Tusch, supra, 113 Idaho 3 7, 7 40 P .2d 1022 (1987) 
("Tusch"). AOB, pp. 18-30. Petrus also examined persuasive authority from 
other jurisdictions that supports his position. See AOB, pp. 30-33 (including, 
for instance, reference to Richman v. Watel, 565 S. W.2d 101 (Tex. 1978) ["the 
breach of the implied warranty of fitness arising from the construction and 
sale of a new house is considered to be a tort rather than contract concept," 
and the statute of limitations on that claim "commences on the breach of the 
implied warranty when the buyer discovers or should discover the injury."]). 
Kirk's response neglects altogether the evolution of the relevant Idaho 
case law from Tomita (holding that a cause of action for breach of the implied 
warranty does not accrue until the claim is first "ascertained by the 
purchaser"), to Salmon Rivers (holding that a claim must arise in tort if there is 
no privity of contract between the parties), to Tusch (holding that "subsequent 
purchasers of residential dwellings, who suffer purely economic losses from 
latent defects . . . may maintain an action against the builder . . . of the 
dwelling based upon the implied warranty of habitability despite the fact that 
no privity of contract exists between the two."). Instead, Kirk relies 
repeatedly (and almost exclusively) on the district court's analysis, and on the 
district court's "inferences" drawn from this Court's decision in Tusch (which, 
in this Court, on a pure issue of law are all ultimately irrelevant). Indeed, Kirk 
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offers no response to the central logic of Petrus' s position ( as elucidated 
above). 
Petrus stands by that argument here. The cause of action by a 
homeowner against a remote seller is recognized in Idaho (Tusch). Since 
there is no privity in that situation, the claim must arise in tort (Salmon 
Rivers). And the statute of limitations on the tort claim does not accrue until it 
has been ( or should have been) ascertained (Tomita). And, thus properly 
understood, it is inescapable that the district court erred in ruling otherwise. 
B. The Economic Loss Rule ls Not Germane to this Appeal. 
Having largely ignored the specific legal issue presented by this appeal, 
Kirk focuses instead on a gratuitous comment by the district court in a 
footnote to its ruling that, "if the claim sounded in tort," it "would be barred 
by the 'economic loss rule' in any event." R. Vol. 1, pp. 979, 1073-1074. But 
in support of the district court's ruling, Kirk's response does little except state 
the rule (which Petrus, of course, acknowledges), and then summarily declare 
that "Petrus's damages all add up to economic loss" (an assertion that was 
never argued in Kirk's motion for summary judgment, and so was never even 
disputed by Petrus). RB, p. 13. 
Petrus's opening brief anticipated this strawman argument, but also 
knocked it down with a series of reasons why the rule does not apply- or at 
least might not apply- to this case. Kirk does not respond to any of those 
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points, but they bear repeating here because they are compelling, and because 
they belie Kirk's superficial conclusion that "Petrus cannot escape application 
of the economic loss rule if the Court finds that his claim for breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability sounds in tort." RB, p. 14. 
First, the district court's conclusion and Kirk's present argument both 
conflict directly with this Court's decision in Tusch, which held specifically 
that "subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings, who suffer purely 
economic losses from latent defects manifesting themselves within a 
reasonable time, may maintain an action against the builder . . .. " Tusch, 113 
Idaho at 50-51 (italics added). After all, to reframe and paraphrase the Court's 
rhetorical question as the conclusion its ruling supports, the common law 
should not deny a subsequent purchaser a remedy against the builder merely 
because there is no privity of contract, and because the damages happen to be 
purely economic, when it was the conduct of the builder which created the 
latent defect in the first place. Id. at 51. 
Second, Kirk does not dispute that his motion for summary judgment 
never even suggested the economic loss rule, never summarized what the 
evidence was on the subject of Petrus's damages, and never argued how the 
rule might (or might not) apply to this case. Now, on appeal, Kirk points to 
several snippets of deposition testimony from Petrus on the subject of 
damages that happened to be part of the record, but none of this was called out 
or relevant to the issue framed by Kirk's motion for summary judgment (and 
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so was never challenged or supplemented by Petrus with contrary or 
additional evidence). Even the evidence on this point cited by Kirk makes 
clear that the state of discovery on the issue of Petrus's damages was not 
complete and not yet exhaustive. R. Vol. 1, pp. 301-303. 
Third, and most importantly, Petrus's opening brief explained that the 
economic loss rule is not absolute. AOB, pp. 33-36. For instance, it does not 
apply where there is a "special relationship" between the parties, that is, 
"where the relationship ... is such that it would be equitable to impose such a 
duty" (like here, where Kirk, a builder, is a "professional" who "holds 
[himself! out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized 
function"). Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 
996, 1000 (2005) ("Blahd''). Similarly, the Court in Blahd recognized that the 
rule does not apply in any "unique circumstances requiring a different 
allocation of risk." Id. at 302 ( citing Just 's Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 
99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978)). And, most to the point here, 
the rule does not apply where, like here, the economic loss is parasitic to 
property damage or personal injury (a point that Petrus never had the 
opportunity to present evidence on in this district court). 
Finally, Petrus invites the Court to revisit Justice Bistline's opinion in 
Tusch, which recognized that Idaho has long been moving in the direction of 
providing more protection for consumers who suffer economic loss, and 
which suggested that the majority opinion ultimately required recognition of a 
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new cause of action. With that recognition, the Court should also rule that the 
economic loss rule simply does not apply to a claim like Petrus's because, 
whatever specific damages Petrus proves to have, the most common form of 
damages in this type of case would be, specifically, the economic damages 
caused by the underlying negligent construction, and those are precisely what 
that cause of action was designed to remedy. 
C. Kirk's Additional Arguments Are Not Persuasive. 
Kirk's Respondent's Brief presents three additional arguments why the 
summary judgment in his favor should be affirmed: because Petrus 
supposedly failed to comply with statutory prerequisites to filing suit, because 
Kirk is supposedly a beneficiary of the waiver provision in the purchase 
contract between Petrus and Gentry-Boyd, and because policy reasons 
supposedly favor Kirk's position. 
Petrus replies generally that those arguments were all advanced below, 
and that none of them were considered or ruled upon by the district court ( as 
Kirk acknowledges, at RB, p. 14). That is probably because Kirk's arguments 
in the district court depended on disputed facts ( for instance, whether Petrus 
provided Kirk sufficient opportunity to inspect and repair), which made the 
issues unsuitable for summary judgment, and makes them even more 
unsuitable for initial factual review and resolution by this Court, on appeal. 
See R. Vol. 1, pp. 828-830. 
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Otherwise, Kirk's "failure to comply" argument is that "the filing of 
suit claiming excessive damage outside the scope of [Petrus' s] notice letter, 
prior to allowing Kirk a second opportunity to inspect the Home, violated the 
statutory prerequisites and should result in [a] bar to suit against Kirk." RB, p. 
15. That argument is not persuasive, since the law is clear that the notice 
prescribed by Idaho's Notice of Opportunity to Repair Act (1.C. § 6-2503) 
only requires that written notice "state that the claimant asserts a construction 
defect claim against the construction professional and ... describe the claim in 
reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the defect." Id. 
See also Mendenhall v. Aldaus, 146 Idaho 434, 436, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008) 
(holding that the phrase "reasonable detail'' is satisfied when a claimant 
provides a builder with enough information to identify the general nature and 
location of the defect). Petrus's detailed and specific claim easily satisfied 
that low standard here, and at least raised a question of fact that could not be 
resolved by summary judgment (and all the more cannot now be resolved by 
this Court). R. Vol. 1, p. 829 [ii 23]; pp. 870-873. 
Kirk's "waiver" argument is also not persuasive, since the disclaimer 
Kirk points to as the source of his position is not enforceable at all under the 
authority of Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154 Idaho 866, 303 P.3d 225 (2013) 
( examining an identical disclaimer clause, but rejecting it as insufficient 
absent evidence of actual knowledge and intent by the buyer). Here, as in 
Goodspeed, questions of fact exist on those points, and on whether the clause 
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in question is sufficiently conspicuous to be enforceable. Again, those are 
factual issues which the district court was not prepared to resolve by summary 
judgment, and which cannot be resolved in the first instance by this Court. 
Finally, Kirk suggests just one policy reason why summary judgment 
should be affirmed, namely "that modem homebuilders [ should] not be held 
accountable on their projects forever, or even for a decade." RB, p. 18. As 
support, Kirk observes that this case involves "a house built on the lake in 
McCall," where "winters are harsh," with "lots of snow and perfect conditions 
for forming ice." RB, p. 18. Petrus acknowledges Kirk's points that "Mother 
Nature provides challenges"; but the "harsh winter environment" Kirk alludes 
to is actually one more reason why unsophisticated buyers need to be 
protected from negligent, cost-cutting contractors, who can easily construct a 
home that will weather a few winters, but will predictably prove to be 
defective after the relatively short statutory period provided by the statutes of 
limitations for breach of oral contract (four years) and written contract (five 
years). 
In sum, Kirk's additional issues all tum on questions of fact and 
judgment calls about competing public policies. They should not distract this 
Court from the single, compelling legal issue presented by this appeal, that is, 
dealing with the fundamental nature of a claim for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability. 
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IV. 
RESPONSE RE: CROSS APPEAL 
A. The Facts. 
After summary judgment was granted, Kirk filed a motion seeking an 
award of about $145,000 in attorneys' fees and about $4,500 in costs. R. Vol. 
1, p. 1025. Kirk's claim to attorneys' fees was based on both Idaho Code 
section 12-120(3) (providing for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing 
party in "any commercial transaction"), and section 12-121 (providing for an 
award of attorneys' fees when a case was "brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation"). 
Petrus filed objections to Kirk's motion, conceding that Kirk was 
entitled to his claimed costs, but explaining that Kirk was not entitled to an 
award of attorneys' fees because his (Petrus' s) claims did not "arise from a 
commercial transaction," and were not brought frivolously. R. Vol. 1, pp. 
1076-1087. Kirk filed reply papers in support of his motion, arguing again 
that the case did involve a "commercial transaction," and again that "none of 
the claims brought by Petrus against Kirk were legitimately brought or 
pursued." R. Vol. 1, pp. 1142-1146. Thereafter, the district court filed its 
Order, awarding Kirk $4,578.72 in costs (as essentially stipulated), denying 
Kirk's claim for fees under section 12-120(3) (in short, because "there was no 
transaction between Kirk and Petrus," R. Vol. 1, p. 1152), and awarding Kirk 
$10,000 in attorneys' fees under section 12-121 (because Petrus originally 
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filed what the district court considered to be a frivolous conspiracy to defraud 
claim). R. Vol. 1, pp. 1165-1156. 
B. Kirk's Appeal on the Attorneys' Fees Issue. 
Kirk filed a cross-appeal from the district court's order awarding costs 
and attorneys' fees. R. Vol. l,p. 1177. 
In the Cross-Appellant's portion of his combined brief, Kirk did not 
argue that the district court erred in denying his motion under section 12-
120(3) (and so Petrus does not address that aspect of the ruling further here). 
Instead, Kirk's single argument was simply that the district court's award of 
fees to Kirk amounted to "less than seven percent of the total fees incurred," 
which, he says, "no exercise of reason" can support. RB, pp. 20-21 . 
Kirk concedes this is an issue reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard, and accurately recites that the inquiry on appeal is simply whether 
the district court "correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion," whether 
it "acted within the boundaries of its discretion," and whether it "reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." RB, p. 8, citing Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 
187, 193, 11 P.3d 1107, 1113 (Ct. App. 2008). 
C. Discussion. 
First, the district court obviously understood that the issue presented by 
Kirk's request under section 12-121 was "one of discretion." Its Order recites 
the proper statutory standard-whether an action was "brought, pursued, or 
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defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation"-and then recites 
specifically: "Whether that is the case is a discretionary determination." R. 
Vol. 1, p. 1153, citing Idaho Military Historical Society v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 
624, 631-632, 329 P.3d 1072, 1079-1080 (2014). 
The second and third questions-whether the district court "acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion," and "reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason"-are easily answered with reference to the district court's 
detailed, six-page order. There, it recited a thorough chronology of the case 
from its inception, through Kirk's deletion of his negligence claim in his 
amended complaint, Kirk's motion for summary judgment, Petrus's 
concession to summary judgment on his conspiracy-to-defraud claim, and the 
ultimate entry of judgment in favor of Kirk on Petrus's remaining breach of 
the implied warranty claim. R. Vol. 1, pp. 1150-1156. The district court then 
concluded that Petrus's short-lived negligence claim did not warrant an award 
of fees because, even assuming it was frivolous, "the record doesn't show that 
Kirk was ever served with process or ever appeared in the action before the 
first amended complaint [ which did not include a negligence claim] was 
filed." R. Vol. 1, p. 1153-1154. Moreover, the district court declined to 
award fees for Petrus' s claim for breach of the implied warranty because, 
while it was "decidedly weaker than Kirk's position," it "wasn't frivolous." 
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Otherwise, the district court concluded that Petrus's claim for 
conspiracy to defraud was frivolous ("borders on preposterous"), and awarded 
fees with reference to it in an amount "that approximates the amount by which 
Kirk's attorneys' fees were increased as a result of Petrus's pursuit of the 
[single frivolous claim]." R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. In reaching that amount, the 
district court acknowledged that "a precise apportionment isn't possible," that 
it had reviewed Kirk's itemization of his attorneys' fees and "other pertinent 
portions of the record," and that it "arrived at [a solution] that is reasonable in 
its judgment." R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. Specifically, it considered that "almost all 
of the work that was necessary to defend against the conspiracy to defraud 
claim [ was also] necessary to defend against the implied warranty claim," and 
that "most of the work [ on discovery issues] pertained to both claims 
indivisibly or to the implied warranty claim in particular." R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. 
On that basis, the district court concluded: "In an exercise of its discretion, 
the Court apportions $10,000 of Kirk's attorneys' fees to the frivolous 
conspiracy-to-defraud claim." R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. 
The district court also justified its exercise of discretion on the fact that 
Kirk could have sought summary judgment "much earlier in the course of 
litigation and obviated the need to litigate that claim any further." R. Vol. 1, 
p. 1155. Finally, the district court concluded it would be "inequitable to make 
a six-figure award of attorneys' fees when an early statue-of-limitations 
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challenge to Petrus's plainly stronger claim might have nipped the litigation in 
the bud by leaving Petrus with only a pie-in-the-sky conspiracy-to-defend 
claim." R. Vol. 1, p. 1156. 
The law in this respect is clear. An award of attorneys' fees is, in the 
first instance, "within the discretion of the trial court; and, on appeal, the party 
claiming error with respect to a trial court order on fees bears the burden of 
demonstrating the trial court abused its discretion. Brady v. City of Homedale, 
130 Idaho 569, 573, 944 P.2d 704, 708 (1997). Kirk has not met that test here. 
In sum, the district court understood that this issue involved its exercise 
of discretion, and its ruling supports the conclusion that it "acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion," and "reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." There was no abuse of discretion here, and the district court's ruling 
in this respect should be affirmed. 
D. Kirk's Request for Attorneys' Fees Must Be Denied. 
Kirk includes a final argument in is brief that he should be awarded 
attorneys' fees on appeal because, he believes Petrus pursued this appeal "with 
no hope of prevailing," did not present a good-faith argument," and attempted 
"simply an attempt to drag out the inevitable and force Kirk to incur more 
fees." RB, p. 22. 
Kirk is wrong. First, he is wrong to even suggest that Petrus has "no 
hope of prevailing." On the contrary, Petrus sincerely believes his analysis of 
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the relevant case law supports his position, and is confident this Court, on due 
consideration of the authority presented, will agree, and will reverse the 
summary judgment entered against him. However, even if this Court 
disagrees with his position, Petrus submits that this is the way the common 
law develops. Responsible attorneys make reasoned arguments to trial courts, 
courts of appeal, and Supreme Courts explaining why-based on the evolution 
of case law or developing ideas of social policy-the law should evolve in the 
direction suggested. That, at a minimum, is what Petrus has done here; that is, 
brought to this Court's attention an issue that it has not considered directly in 
three decades. That can hardly be deemed to be frivolous or deserving of an 
award of attorneys' fees on appeal to Kirk. 
Moreover, the law is clear that, even if Kirk prevails on Petrus's appeal, 
if he does not also prevail on his cross-appeal, he cannot be deemed to be the 
"prevailing party" for purposes of an award of attorneys' fees on appeal. KEE 
Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 755, 101 P.3d 690, 699 (2004). 
Here, Petrus believes that Kirk cannot possibly prevail on his cross-appeal-
given the forgiving abuse of discretion standard and the trial court's careful 
consideration and rejection of all the points raised by Kirk- and that he, 
therefore, cannot be awarded his attorneys' fees on appeal. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated here and in his opening brief, Petrus 
reiterates his essential position, that the district court erred as a matter of law 
in ruling that his claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability was 
governed by the statute that controls actions on a contract, rather than those 
that control actions on a tort. In that respect, Petrus also reiterates his prayer 
that the district court's ruling granting summary judgment be reversed, and the 
matter remanded for further proceedings on the merits. 
Otherwise, the district court's order awarding Kirk $10,000 was an 
appropriate exercise of discretion, and should be affirmed. 
Dated: October 13, 2017 
Dated: October 13, 2017 
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